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ADOPTING A RESPECTFUL POSTURE TOWARD
TEACHER RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION: AN
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS OF
NORTH CAROLINA'S RESPECT FOR STUDENT
PRAYER AND RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY LAW
Brian S. Gwyn*
I. INTRODUCTION
"It's a sad day in America when we can't tell a coach they can
bow their head when a student is leading a prayer."' This statement by
North Carolina State Senator Warren Daniel encapsulates the sentiment
of those who supported a recently enacted law clarifying the rights of
school employees. Depending on your politics, you may view Senator
Daniel's assessment as a sign of progress or confirmation that religious
rights are being eroded.
Senator Daniel's statement was prompted by an issue that arose
in McDowell County, N.C. in 2012. The McDowell County School
Board purportedly told high school athletic coaches that they had to
leave the locker room if students spontaneously engaged in prayer before
or after athletic events.2 Lawmakers, seeing this as an encroachment
against religious freedom, attempted to restore the balance by passing
Senate Bill 370, the Respect for Student Prayer/Religious Activity law
("S.B. 370")' in June of 2014. In passing S.B. 370, Senator Stan
* Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2016;
Staff Member, First Amendment Law Review.
1. Laura Leslie, House Panel OKs Prayer for Faculty, WRAL (June 3, 2014),
http://www.wral.com/house-panel-oks-prayer-for-
faculty/i 3697305/#uWFvfeGD2UfcWl Qy.99.
2. David Exum, McCrory Signs Bingham-sponsored Prayer Bill into Law, THE
DISPATCH, June 23, 2014, http://www.the-dispatch.com/article/20140623/
News/306239990.
3. The Respect for Student Prayer/Religious Activity Act, S.B. 370, 2013-
2014 Sess. (codified in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.30-33), available at
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/Senate/PDF/S370v6.pdf.
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Bingham, one of the primary sponsors of the bill, said the new law would
remedy situations like those in McDowell County because it would allow
coaches to maintain their roles as sources of "instruction, guidance, and
inspiration.
Opponents of the law argue that a coach's unique supervisory
role providing "instruction, guidance, and inspiration" is precisely why
they should not participate in student-led prayer.5 On August 25, 2014,
Americans United for Separation of Church and State ("Americans
United") 6 entered the fray and sent each school district in North Carolina
a letter, warning them that compliance with the law could violate the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause. 7 In their letter, Americans
United argued that allowing teachers to lead or participate in student
religious activity would violate the Constitution.
8
Soon after, the Alliance Defending Freedom ("A.D.F."), 9 an
organization of Christian attorneys who advocate for religious freedom,
fired back with a follow-up letter to North Carolina school districts,
telling them they need not "flee the room ' when students engage in
4. Mary Anderson, New law clarifies students' right to pray, THE COURIER-
TRIBUNE, June 21, 2014, http://courier-tribune.com/news/new-law-clarifies-students-
right-pray ("The students rely on their coach for instruction, guidance, and
inspiration. . . . Instead of leaving the room, Senate Bill 370 allows the coach to
adopt a respectful posture during a student-led prayer, thus maintaining his
connection with his athletes.").
5. Letter from Americans United for Separation of Church and State to North
Carolina Boards of Education (August 25, 2014), available at https://www.au.org/
files/NC%2OSchool%20Board.pdf [hereinafter Americans United Letter].
6. Americans United for Separation of Church and State is an organization
"dedicated to preserving the constitutional principle of church-state separation as the
only way to ensure religious freedom for all Americans." AMERICANS UNITED FOR
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: OUR MISSION, https://www.au.org/about/our-
mission (last visited Mar. 1,2015).
7. Americans United Letter, supra note 5.
8. Id. ("[T]he Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution prohibits school personnel from leading or participating in student
religious activity.").
9. A.D.F., founded by Christian attorneys in 1994, "advocates for the right of
people to freely live out their faith." ALLIANCE DEFENDING FREEDOM: ABOUT US,
http://www.alliancedefendingfreedom.org/about (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
10. Letter from Alliance Defending Freedom to North Carolina School
Superintendents (September 2, 2014), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/
files/NCSchoolsLetter.pdf.
religious activity.1 A.D.F. argued that school employees, "when not on
contract time," 12 had a constitutionally protected right to "engage in
public and private religious expression with anyone and at any location
(including school property)."1 3 In their view, during "contract time,"
employees could be present during student prayer to provide supervision
and even "bow[] their heads," 14 as long as they did not "actively
participate" in the religious expression.'5
The ongoing debate over S.B. 370 illustrates the doctrinal
tension that currently exists regarding religious expression among
students and school employees. Although S.B. 370 was enacted to
simplify complicated First Amendment law, it may actually lead to
greater confusion among teachers, administrators, students, and parents. 
16
This Note examines S.B. 370 in light of existing First Amendment
jurisprudence. Part II provides an overview of how courts have analyzed
Establishment Clause cases. Part HI discusses how courts have treated
Establishment Clause concerns in the face of teachers' First Amendment
claims. Part IV analyzes the applicable provisions of S.B. 370. Finally,
Part V argues that the degree to which school staff may participate in
religious activities with students is a close question of law that varies
greatly depending on the unique facts and circumstances of each case.
Therefore, while S.B. 370 may survive a facial challenge, it likely
encourages religious conduct that violates the Establishment Clause.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Given that national groups such as Americans United and A.D.F. have
publicly drawn dramatically opposite conclusions about the constitutionality of S.B.
370, it is not difficult to imagine that teachers will be confused about what their
rights actually are. Portions of the law that purport to provide a clear standard,
regardless of the context, may violate First Amendment. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §
115C-407.32(b) (2014) ("[Teachers may] participat[e] in religious activities on
school grounds that are initiated by students at reasonable times before or after the
instructional day so long as such activities are voluntary for all parties ...."); see
also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.32(c) (2014) (Teachers "may adopt a respectful
posture" during extracurricular activities when students engaged in voluntary
prayer).
[Vol. 13428 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIE W
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1I. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The First Amendment to the Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."17 The bedrock of the Establishment
Clause rests on two fundamental principles: (1) a "wall of separation
between Church and State" exists to protect both believers and
nonbelievers;' 8 and (2) the government may not coerce or encourage
citizens to adopt different beliefs and practices.' 9 Conversely, while the
Establishment Clause creates a negative right, the Free Exercise Clause
creates a positive right, one that protects religious liberty and allows
individuals freedom to practice the religion of their choice. 20
It is sometimes unclear where the Free Exercise Clause ends and
the Establishment Clause begins, especially when the exercise of one's
21beliefs involves state action. As a result, the two First Amendment
clauses often are at odds with one another and the Supreme Court has
struggled to articulate a uniform, lasting, standard to evaluate
22Establishment Clause claims. As Parts IJ.A and B explain, the
applicable Establishment Clause tests and their methodology largely
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (upholding
a New Jersey district's practice of reimbursing families for transportation expenses,
regardless of whether children attended public or private schools, based on the fact
that the practice was neutral toward religion).
19. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §
12.3.1 (3d ed. 2006) ("[T]he government may not compel or punish religious beliefs;
people may think and believe anything that they want.").
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102-03
(2001) (finding no Establishment Clause violation where a Christian club used
school facilities after the instructional day); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 822-23 (1995) (finding no Establishment Clause
violation if public university were to spend funds on Christian student organization
where the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses compelled the expenditures, since
other student organizations received similar funds.).
22. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) ("[W]e have repeatedly
emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in this
sensitive area."); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 405 (5th Cir.
1995) (noting "modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence is rife with confusion.").
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depend on the context of each case. To highlight the doctrinal
differences, Part II.A describes early Supreme Court cases that employed
a stricter test for government involvement with religion and Part II.B
discusses various tests that have evolved over time, often providing a
more lenient standard for government officials than the predecessor test.
A. Impregnable Wall of Separation
Public schools are often at the intersection of this doctrinal
24
tension between the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause. In25th
1947, in Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, the
Supreme Court declared that the constitution requires a "wall of
26
separation" between church and state. In Everson, a New Jersey statute
allowed local districts discretion to structure student transportation to and
27from school. Based on the law, local districts like Ewing Township
decided to reimburse parents whose children traveled to and from school
via public transit.' 8 While some parents of children in public schools
claimed the benefit, reimbursements were also claimed by parents whose
29
children were enrolled in private Catholic schools. Soon after, a citizen
brought suit, alleging that the statute violated the Establishment Clause.3°
On review, the Court upheld the statute, determining that the law was
neutral to religion, in that it allowed districts to cover transportation costs
of both public and private parochial school students. 3' Thus, while the
Court declared that there is "a wall between church and state," it was not
32breached in this case.
23. Id. ("[W]e have repeatedly emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to
any single test or criterion in this sensitive area.").
24. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992) ("The concern [about indirect
coercion] may not be limited to the context of schools, but it is most pronounced
there.").
25. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
26. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)).
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 3-4.
31. Id. at 18.
32. Id.
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Everson proved to be a seminal case in the Court's development
of the neutrality principle. In 1968, in Epperson v. Arkansas,33 the Court
invalidated an Arkansas law that banned the teaching of evolution in
schools receiving public funds, largely because the law failed to maintain
religious neutrality like the statute at issue in Everson.
34
Three years later, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court
consolidated its reasoning from Everson, Epperson, and other cases 35 to
articulate a workable standard for analyzing Establishment Clause
36 37
claims. In Lemon, the Court invalidated statutes in Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island that provided resources directly to religious schools for the
purpose of teaching secular subjects.38 The Court held that to survive
Establishment Clause scrutiny, a government program must: (1) have a
valid secular purpose;39 (2) not have the "principal or primary effect" of
either "advanc[ing] []or inhibit[ing] religion ' 40 and (3) not create "an
excessive government entanglement with religion."
4
'
To evaluate the purpose of the statutes, the Court looked first to
the stated intent.42 Since the laws had the purpose of "enhanc[ing] the
quality of the secular education in all schools," the Court gave deference
33. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
34. Id. at 109 ("Arkansas' law cannot be defended as an act of religious
neutrality. Arkansas did not seek to excise from the curricula of its schools and
universities all discussion of the origin of man. The law's effort was confined to an
attempt to blot out a particular theory because of its supposed conflict with the
Biblical account, literally read. Plainly, the law is contrary to the mandate of the
First, and in violation of the Fourteenth, Amendment to the Constitution."). In its
holding, the Court ruled that schools may not organize their curriculum around a
particular set of religious beliefs. Id. at 106.
35. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Bd. of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
36. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 606-07.
39. Id. at 612.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 612-13. To distinguish Lemon from Everson, the Court noted that in
Lemon, the government provided funding directly to the private schools. Id. at 621.
42. Id. at 613.
432 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol.13
to this stated secular purpose.43 When looking at the effect of the statutes,
the Court found that they primarily benefited religious schools.
44
From 1971-1992, the Lemon test was the primary method of
analysis for Establishment Clause cases. However, as Part II.B
illustrates, in the wake of new competing Establishment Clause tests, the
46Lemon test has lost its status as the gold standard within the doctrine.
B. Penetrating the Wall
As the makeup of the Court changed, dissatisfaction with the
Lemon test became apparent. 47 Slowly, the "wall of separation,"
traditionally kept high and impregnable, became malleable and
permeable, as Justices increasingly chose to focus on the original intent
of the founding fathers.48 As a result, new tests emerged, supplementing,
and even on occasion supplanting, the Lemon Test.49 In the modem era,
43. Id. at 613.
44. Id. at 609. Since the states became involved in the "details of
administration," the result was an entanglement violation. Id. at 615.
45. Robert C. Stelle, Comment, Religious Freedom in the Twenty-First
Century: Life Without Lemon, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 657, 663 (1999).
46. Id. at 664.
47. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Like some ghoul in a late-night horror
movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly
killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again,
frightening the little children and school attorneys."); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 688-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It has never been entirely clear,
however, how the three parts of the [Lemon] test relate to the principles enshrined in
the Establishment Clause.").
48. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98-99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("the Court's opinion in Everson-while correct in bracketing Madison and Jefferson
together in their exertions in their home State leading to the enactment of the
Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty-is totally incorrect in suggesting that Madison
carried these views onto the floor of the United States House of Representatives
when he proposed the language which would ultimately become the Bill of
Rights.").
49. See e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding a
town creche display because there was no endorsement either through intent or
effect); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (upholding legislative prayer
based on a historical practices test); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252 (1982)
(invalidating a Minnesota statute that discriminated against religious organizations
based on strict scrutiny test).
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the Supreme Court has employed at least five Establishment Clause tests
in addition to Lemon: (1) the strict scrutiny test; 50 (2) the historical
practices test; 51 (3) the modified Lemon/endorsement test; 52 (4) the
coercion test;53 (5) and the neutrality test.54
1. Strict Scrutiny Test
The first departure from the Lemon test occurred in the 1982
decision, Larson v. Valente,55 where the Court invalidated a Minnesota
statute imposing regulations only on certain religious organizations.5 6 In
Larson, the Minnesota Charitable Solicitation Act required non-profit
organizations to register with the state and comply with various
requirements, such as reporting costs and expenditures. 57 If the
organization spent an "unreasonable amount" on management and
fundraising expenses, the state would revoke its charitable solicitation
50. Larson, 456 U.S. at 246 (invalidating a Minnesota law because it was not
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest).
51. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792-93 (upholding legislative prayer where the
historical pattern demonstrated that it was never intended to be prohibited by the
Establishment Clause).
52. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding a town
creche display because there was no endorsement either through intent or effect).
53. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (invalidating adult-led prayer at
middle and high school graduation ceremony based on the coercive effect of the
structured environment).
54. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 230 (1997) (allowing New York district
to implement federally-funded program that involved providing remedial instruction
to students at private schools on the basis that the program operated with "equal
force" when the services were provided off campus). The neutrality test is also
sometimes referred to as the "nondiscrimination test." JAMES RAPP, EDUCATION LAW
§ 2.01(4)(d)(iii) (Matthew Bender & Co. 2014). As most opinions employ multiple
tests, it is sometimes difficult to tease out the difference between the neutrality test
and the endorsement test, in particular. In many cases, their reasoning overlaps. See,
e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Westside Comm. Schs. v. Mergens By and Through Mergens,
496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990). This Note distinguishes the neutrality test from the
endorsement test in that the neutrality test requires the government to protect private
religious speech, even if one could reasonably attribute it to the government. The
endorsement test includes the latter limitation.
55. 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
56. Id. at 255.
57. Id. at 230-31.
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license. 58 Originally, religious organizations were exempt from such
requirements, but in 1978, the Minnesota legislature amended the act to
only exempt religious organizations receiving over half of their funds
• • 59
from members or affiliated organizations. In their holding, the Larson
Court used a strict scrutiny standard, similar to the standard used in equal
protection cases, to strike down the statute. 60 The Court held that the
nexus between the fifty percent rule at issue in the case was not
"necessary" to any "compelling interest" the state offered, and therefore
was impermissible under the First Amendment.6'
2. Historical Test
Similarly, in Marsh v. Chambers,62 the Court determined that the63 I
Lemon test was inapplicable to the context of legislative prayer. In
Marsh, the Court was faced with a challenge to the Nebraska
legislature's practice of opening each session with prayer. 64 Instead of
65
applying the Lemon test, as the lower court did, the Supreme Court
relied on the "historical" and "unbroken practice" of legislative prayer
66dating back to colonial times. While the Court acknowledged that• • 67
"historical patterns" alone do not justify constitutional violations, such
practices do provide insight into the actual intent of the Framers.61
Ultimately, the Court determined that legislative prayers were
constitutional regardless of a Lemon analysis because the "historical
69pattern" suggested they were never intended to be proscribed.
58. Id. at 231 (citing S 309.555 Subd. La Supp. 1982).
59. Id. at 231-32.
60 Id. at 246 (invalidating a Minnesota law because it was not narrowly
tailored to a compelling government interest).
61. Id. at 255.
62. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
63. Id. at 792.
64. Id. at 784-85.
65. Id. at 786.
66. Id. at 795.
67. Id. at 790.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 786.
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3. Endorsement Test
In 1984, Justice O'Connor created an entirely new test in her
concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.V In Lynch, the Court upheld
Pawtucket, Rhode Island's annual creche, which included religious
symbols unique to Christmas. 7' The majority noted that the Court need
not be confined to one test, but still relied heavily on Lemon. 2 In her
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor utilized the first two prongs of
Lemon to articulate an alternative test-the endorsement test. 73In
conducting the endorsement analysis, the Court asks "whether a
reasonable observer would believe that a particular action constitutes an
endorsement of religion by the government." 74
The endorsement test is relatively strict compared to other tests
discussed below, in that it takes less government action to cross the
threshold into being an Establishment Clause violation.75
70. 465 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 671 (majority opinion).
72. Id. at 679, 684.
73. Id. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
74. Id. at-690; Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 479 (6th Cir. 2002). Under the
endorsement test, the entanglement prong of the Lemon test is deemphasized,
because it often proved to be the most difficult prong to define. Lynch, 465 U.S. at
690. Instead of a separate criterion, an entanglement violation would exist if the
government action would be reasonably perceived as religious endorsement. Id. at
688. Subsequently, Establishment Clause cases that invoke the Lemon Test generally
rely on the version modified by the endorsement test. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 668-69 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In Agostini v.
Felton .... we folded the entanglement inquiry into the primary effect inquiry.");
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 116 (2001); Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) ("In cases involving state participation
in a religious activity, one of the relevant questions is 'whether an objective
observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the
statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools."');
Adland, 307 F.3d at 479 (using endorsement test deny the relocation of Ten
Commandments monument to state capitol grounds).
75. See, e.g., Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 815 (8th Cir.
2004) (using neutrality test and finding no violation for teacher's noncurricular
involvement; Doe v. Wilson County Doe v. Wilson Cnty. Sch. Sys., 564 F. Supp. 2d
766, 792-93 (M.D. Tenn. May 29, 2008) (using endorsement test and finding
violation for teacher's noncurricular involvement).
4. Coercion Test
In 1992, the Court decided Lee v. Weisman,76 which invalidated
prayer at school graduation ceremonies, determining that it "coerced"
students into participating in religious activity. 77 This "coercion test,"
enunciated by Justice Kennedy, is based on the idea that regardless of the
more strict Lemon analysis, the Constitution does not permit religious
78
coercion.
In Lee, the school district permitted principals to invite members
of the clergy to provide invocations and benedictions at middle and high
school graduation ceremonies.7 9 Daniel Weisman objected to the practice
prior to his daughter's middle school graduation exercise, but the school
principal nevertheless invited a rabbi to deliver prayers. 8 During the
ceremony, students stood for the Pledge of Allegiance and remained
81
standing during the prayers.
In deciding Lee, the Court sidestepped more strict tests because,
in Justice Kennedy's view, the facts of the case violated a standard even
82
more lenient to government actors. The Court expressed concern for the
impressionability of young students, who are more likely to be coerced
into or out of religious activity than adults. 83 Whereas acts of religious
endorsement, such as the prayer in Lee, can be carefully weighed by
adults, young students may see the actions at directive, strengthening the
possibility of religious coercion.84
76. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
77. Id. at 599, 609.
78. Id. at 587 ("[A]t a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government
may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or
otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith ....
79. Id. at 581.
80. Id. at 581.
81. Id. at 583.
82. Id. ("We can decide the case without reconsidering the general
constitutional framework by which public schools' efforts to accommodate religion
are measured. Thus we do not accept the invitation of petitioners and amicus the
United States to reconsider our decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman)."
83. Id. at 592.
84. Id. There are some signs, however, that this concern for the age of the
student may be less relevant to the present Court. Good News Club v. Milford Cent.
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 115 (2001) (noting as irrelevant the fact that students participating
in the after-school religious club were of elementary-school age where parents had
436 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W REVIEW [Vol. 13
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The Court's heightened concern for religious coercion among
students articulated in Lee continued in Santa Fe Independent School
District v. Doe,85 where the Court invalidated a school's practice of
allowing an elected speaker to give an invocation before each home
football game. 86 Like Lee, in Santa Fe, the Court applied the coercion
test, finding that students attending the football games had little choice
regarding participation.87 Therefore, the pre-game prayers violated the
Establishment Clause.88
5. Neutrality Test
In an increasing number of cases, the Court has focused on the
First Amendment expectations of the religious actors. 89 Though the
given permission). Admittedly, the Court has not been clear on this point and lower
courts still sometimes make the distinction. See, e.g., Doe v. Wilson Cnty. Sch. Sys.,
564 F. Supp. 2d 766, 795 (M.D. Tenn. May 29, 2008) (noting the "influential effect"
on 51h grade students of adults wearing "I Prayed" stickers); Daugherty v. Vanguard
Charter Sch. Acad., 116 F. Supp. 2d 897, 908 (W.D. Mich. 2000) ("The Court
recognizes that the age of the 'audience' is an important factor in the analysis."); but
see Herdahl v. Pontotoc Cnty. Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 582, 590 (N.D. Miss. 1996)
(resolving concerns about impressionability of students based on parent's informed
written consent). While concerns for coercion still exist, some justices have come to
different conclusions about what constitutes coercion. For example, Justice Kennedy
based his opinion in Lee on that fact that "subtle coercion" by the state pressured
students to participate in a religious practice. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588
(1992). In his dissent, Justice Scalia agreed that coercion violates the Establishment
Clause, however, he did not find it. Id. at 641-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But there
is simply no support for the proposition that the officially sponsored
nondenominational invocation and benediction read by Rabbi Gutterman-with no
one legally coerced to recite them-violated the Constitution of the United States.").
Therefore, even the same test can be employed in different ways, creating different
results.
85. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311-12 (2000) ("We
stressed in Lee the obvious observation that 'adolescents are often susceptible to
pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is strongest in
matters of social convention."').
86. Id. at317.
87. Id. at 309.
88. Id. at317.
89. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 120 (finding no Establishment
Clause violation if religious group gained access to facilities after-school based on
the creation of a limited public forum); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
437
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Court does not universally refer to it as such, this test can best be
described as the "neutrality test."90 In Board of Education of Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens,9 1 the Court upheld the Equal Access Act
(EAA), which requires schools that accept federal funds to refrain from
discrimination based on content or viewpoint when granting access to
facilities. 92 Based on Mergens, if at least one noncurricular group is
allowed access to school facilities, any group requesting access must be
given similar access. 93 The neutrality test was further developed in
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,94 where
the Court held that the distribution of student fees by a public university
to a student religious publication was not an Establishment Clause
violation. 95 There, the Court reasoned that the students' speech was
private, not public speech and that government endorsement or coercion
concerns were minimal in light of other school-funded student
organizations. 96
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841-42 (1995) (finding no Establishment Clause
violation if public university were to provide religious organization with funds,
similar to other nonreligious student groups); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Given the
issues presented as well as the apparent unanimity of our conclusion that this overt,
viewpoint-based discrimination contradicts the Speech Clause of the First
Amendment and that there has been no substantial showing of a potential
Establishment Clause violation, I agree with Justice SCALIA that the Court's
citation of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971),
is unsettling and unnecessary."); Bd. of Educ. of Westside Comm. Schs. v. Mergens
By and Through Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990).
90. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652-53, 697 (2002) (upholding
Ohio vouchers to religious schools based on their neutrality with respect to religion).
91. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226. While many observers point to later cases as
sources of the neutrality test, Mergens was the first test that started to hint at using
neutrality principles associated with free speech jurisprudence in the school setting
when analyzing Establishment Clause claims.
92. Id. at 231.
93. Id. at 235 (holding that Christian club would not violate Establishment
Clause where other noncurricular clubs, such as a scuba-diving club and chess club,
had similar access).
94. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
95. Id. at 834.
96 Id at 850 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Given this wide array of
nonreligious, antireligious and competing religious viewpoints in the forum
supported by the University, any perception that the University endorses one
particular viewpoint would be illogical.").
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Two years after Rosenberger, the Court decided Agostini v.
97 98Felton, which revisited Aguilar v. Felton,  a prior Court decision that
enjoined New York school districts from sending Title I teachers to
private religious schools to provide remedial instruction. 99 Using the
Lemon test, the Aguilar Court had held that while "well-intentioned," the
program created "excessive entanglement of church and state." 100
In reversing the twelve-year-old injunction put in place by
Aguilar, 101 the Supreme Court in Agostini signaled just how significant
the doctrinal shift had become. 02 For the first time, the Court allowed a
comprehensive, federally funded program that provided aid to private
schools,' °3 based solely on the neutrality principle. 104
Most recently, the Court extended the neutrality principle to the
elementary school context in Good News Club v. Milford Central
School.'°5 In Good News, a private Christian organization challenged an
elementary school's denial of access to the cafeteria for weekly meetings
, •106
after school. Whereas the EAA upheld in Mergens only applied to
secondary schools,10 7 the Court in Good News declared that even with
young students, schools cannot discriminate in which groups are allowed
access to school facilities.'08
97. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
98. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 414.
101. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 208.
102. Id. at 240-41 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The result [of the majority's
decision] is to repudiate the very reasonable line drawn in Aguilar and Ball, and to
authorize direct state aid to religious institutions on an unparalleled scale, in
violation of the Establishment Clause's central prohibition against religious subsidies
by the government.").
103. Id.
104. The Court held that as long as the government was being neutral, it need
not discriminate against students who attended religious schools. Id. at 231.
105. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 113-14 (2001)
(finding no Establishment Clause violation if religious group gained access to
facilities after-school based on the creation of a limited public forum).
106. Id. at 103.
107. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Comm. Schs. v. Mergens By and Through
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 233 (1990).
108. GoodNews, 533 U.S. at 115.
In sum, Parts II.A and B illustrate the complex nature of the
Establishment Clause doctrine. In various cases, the Court has employed
the Lemon test, strict scrutiny test, historical practices test, endorsement
test, coercion test, and neutrality test. As Part II.B shows, the utility of
each test often depends on the specific context of the case.109 Part III
discusses how courts analyze Establishment Clause claims against a
teacher's First Amendment rights.
III: BALANCING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE WITH A
TEACHER'S FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
While the Establishment Clause restricts religious expression by
the government, teachers still have individual rights as citizens of the
United States. These rights, however, may be limited while a teacher is
on the job. As an employer, the government is responsible for both
carrying out its mission and also respecting the rights of its employees. 10
When taking action that restricts employee conduct, the government
must balance the employee's First Amendment interests with the
government's interests.' 11 On one hand, the employee's interest is at its
peak when speaking about a matter of public concern or exercising other
constitutionally protected rights."' On the other hand, the orderly
operation of an agency or Establishment Clause concerns weigh in favor
of the government.' 13 However, if the employees' speech takes place
during their normal duties, then the government's discretion usually
prevails. 114
Part III.A provides a brief overview of teacher First Amendment
rights. Parts B, C, and D look at Establishment claims and teacher rights
109. See supra, Part II.
110. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Tp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S.
563, 568 (1968) ("The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.").
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (finding no First
Amendment protection where expressions were made pursuant to plaintiffs job
duties).
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in three distinct employment contexts: curricular activities,
extracurricular activities, and noncurricular activities. Finally, Part III.E
summarizes how courts approach Establishment Clause cases in the face
of teacher First Amendment claims.
A. Overview
Curricular activities refer to "the whole body of courses offered
by an educational institution or one of its branches." '115 While it is true
that teachers, just as students, "do not shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gates,"' 16 teachers
have very few First Amendment rights when engaged in curricular• •• 11718
activities. For example, in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 18 the Supreme
Court gave school officials the authority to restrict speech in school-
sponsored activities when there was a legitimate pedagogical interest.
1 9
While Hazelwood focused on student speech, the implication was that
school authorities could restrict teacher speech as well 
20
Similarly, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 12 the Court held that public
employee speech that occurs pursuant to official duties does not enjoy
the protections of the First Amendment.122 For teachers, this tends to
115. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Comm. Schs. v. Mergens By and Through
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 237 (1990). Courts also sometimes refer to "school-
sponsored activities," which encompass both curricular and extracurricular activities.
See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). School-
sponsored activities include activities that one could "reasonably perceive[ ] to bear
the imprimatur of the school." Id. at 271.
116. Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
117. See generally Neal H. Hutchens, Silence at the Schoolhouse Gate: The
Diminishing First Amendment Rights of Public School Employees, 97 KY. L.J. 37
(2008).
118. 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (upholding school's authority to edit content of
school newspaper).
119. ld. at 273.
120. Hutchens, supra note 117 at 64 ("Though the case centered on student
speech, the majority stated that in the context of school-sponsored speech these
limitations could be applied to teachers and "other members of the school
community.").
121. 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (finding no First Amendment protection where
expressions were made pursuant to plaintiff's job duties).
122. Id.
442 FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 13
mean that their Free Speech and Free Exercise rights are stronger the123
further away from the schoolhouse doors the activity occurs. However,
that does not mean that the government's interest in preventing an
Establishment Clause violation completely disappears. 124
Rather, courts tend to vary on how they analyze an
Establishment claim in the face of a teacher's First Amendment claim.125
The outcome often depends on two factors: the level of the teacher's
involvement and the activity's proximity to students. 126 Within the
"involvement" factor courts have created three distinctions for religious
activity: leading, participating, or supervising.127 Leading involves the
teacher taking active direction over the activity. 128 Participation tends to
include decision-making, 129 recitation,"3 or any "expression of religious
belief' other than "passive" presence.131 Supervision implies a "custodial
123. See, e.g., Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 815 (8th Cir.
2004) (finding no Establishment Clause violation where teacher participated in after-
school religious club).
124. See, e.g., Doe v. Wilson Cnty. Sch. Sys., 564 F. Supp. 2d 766, 795 (M.D.
Tenn. May 29, 2008) (finding Establishment Clause violation even when religious
activity occurred before school).
125. RONNA GREFF SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE
PROCESS AND DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 1:21 (2014) (noting that Establishment
Clause violations may exist if teachers engage in religious expression during their
normal duties); W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
AND THE LAW § 12:6 (2013) (discussing different free speech frameworks in public
schools, such public forum analysis and government-employee speech analysis).
126. SCHNEIDER, supra note 125 at § 1:21; DURHAM & SMITH, supra note 125
at § 12:6 (noting that schools may restrict teacher speech if it could "disrupt [the]
school's operation").
127. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Comm. Schs. v. Mergens By and Through
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990).
128. Id. at 252.
129. Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 56 (W.D. Mich. 1965) (holding that
teachers may not select prayers or Bible readings during prayer sessions before and
after school).
130. Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 411 (5th Cir. 1995)
(Mahon, J., dissenting in part).
131. Daugherty v. Vanguard Charter Sch. Acad., 116 F. Supp. 2d 897, 911
(W.D. Mich. 2000) (denying plaintiffs claim of Establishment Clause violation
where there was no evidence that teachers actually participated in the religious
expression).
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.. • , , 132
purpose[]" that is "nonparticipatory, "merely to ensure order and
good behavior."' 33 With respect to the "proximity" factor, courts often
distinguish between three types of activities: (1) curricular, (2)
.. .- 134
extracurricular, and (3) noncumicular activities. As Part Il1. B. shows,
teacher First Amendment rights vary in each of these different contexts.
B. Curricular Activities
Curricular activities refer to "the whole body of courses offered
by an educational institution or one of its branches."1 35 With respect to
religious expression, teachers' free exercise rights are limited by the
same Establishment Clause concerns as the school as a whole.136 During
curricular activities, Establishment Clause violations trump interests in
religious expression on behalf of school officials. 137
1. Supreme Court Decisions Related to Teacher
Religious Expression in the Classroom
The religious expression of teachers has rarely been the sole
focus of Supreme Court case law. However, some of the Court's cases
implicate teacher rights in the way that they analyze school expressions
132. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 236 (holding that teacher supervision of Christian
club after school would not constitute Establishment Clause violation).
133. Id. at 253. In Mergens, the Court also suggested that proper supervision
required that the school "dissociate itself' from the religious speech. See id at 270
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 237-38; Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72
(1988).
135. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 237. Courts also sometimes refer to "school-
sponsored activities," which encompass both curricular and extracurricular activities.
See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. School-sponsored activities include activities that
one could "reasonably perceive[] to bear the imprimatur of the school." Id. at 271.
136. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 71-72 (1985) (noting that precedents do
not allow teachers to compose and recite official prayers).
137 . Although staff are generally not allowed to "lead" or "actively
participate" in religious activities, there are some outlying cases and circumstances.
See, e.g., Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist., 382 F.3d 807, 815 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding
no Establishment Clause violation where teacher participated in after-school
religious club).
of religion. 138 In Engel v. Vitale,139 the Supreme Court invalidated a law
that required a prayer to be read by the teacher each school day. 14 Engel
was decided before Lemon, but it analyzed the Establishment Clause
claim by looking at the "indirect coercive pressure" that is felt when
government encourages religion. 141 Further, the Court stated that the
Establishment Clause was created to protect both government and
religion. 142 By limiting the actions of the school, the Court implicitly
limited the religious freedom of teachers.
Similarly, in Wallace v. Jaffree,143 the Court invalidated a statute
that required time set aside for meditation or prayer.144 In Wallace, the
complaint indicated that the plaintiffs teachers had actually facilitated
classroom prayer during the set aside time. 14 While the Court did not
directly address the teachers' actions, 146 the holding implicitly limited
their rights to religious expression in the classroom by finding the statute
invalid.1 47 The Court analyzed the claim using the Lemon test, finding
that the statute did not have a secular purpose.148
2. Lower Court Decisions Related to Teacher Religious
Expression in the Classroom
The Supreme Court has not dealt with religious expression
during curricular activities since Wallace. As a result, lower courts have
138. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 (1987) (holding
Louisiana law unconstitutional where the stated purpose was to protect academic
freedom for teachers, but the result was to restrict such freedom); Wallace, 472 U.S.
at 73 (noting that if teachers told students they could use moment of silence to pray
that would constitute endorsement of religion); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)
(invalidating school-sponsored prayer led by teachers).
139. 370 U.S. 421.
140. Id. at 424.
141. Id. at 430-31.
142. Id. at 431 ("[A] union of government and religion tends to destroy
government and degrade religion.").
143. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38.
144. Id. at40.
145. Id. at 42.
146. Id. at41-42.
147. Id. at 55-56.
148. Id.
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taken their cue from other education contexts 149 and often use the
modified Lemon-endorsement test. 1
50
For example, in Holloman v. Harland,"' the Eleventh Circuit
held that a teacher's practice of soliciting prayer requests and enforcing a
152moment of silence violated the Establishment clause. The court used a
modified Lemon-Endorsement test in which the Court looked at whether
the teacher had a valid secular purpose and whether the principal or
primary effect was to advance religion.' 53 The court commented that in
Agostini, the Supreme Court had collapsed the third Lemon prong into
the second. 154 Citing several Supreme Court precedents, including
Wallace, the Eleventh Circuit determined that the teacher's intent to
"teach students compassion, pursuant to the [state's] character education
plan," while an "ostensibly secular purpose" was constitutionally
impermissible because of its "avowedly religious means." "'
Additionally, the teacher's action had the effect of "promot[ing] pray[er],
a religious activity."' 156 Moreover, using language of the endorsement
test, the court declared that the activity could "reasonably appear to be an
'endorsement (of religion)."", 15 7 Therefore, the teacher's actions violated
the Establishment Clause.
58
These examples illustrate that the closer the teacher is to
classroom activities, the weaker a teacher's First Amendment rights
149. See, e.g., Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1284-85
(11 th Cir. 2004) (applying endorsement test to assess Establishment Clause claim
during curricular activity based on the Supreme Court's use of such test in the school
funding context).
150. See, e.g., id. (using endorsement test to find Establishment Clause
violation where teacher solicited prayer requests from students); Marchi v. Bd. of
Coop. Educ. Servs. of Albany, 173 F.3d 469, 475-76 (2d Cir. 1999) (using
endorsement test to see possible Establishment Clause violation where teacher sent
letter to parents including references to religion); Freshwater v. Mt. Vernon Cty.
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 1N.E.3d 335, 489 (Ohio 2013) (using endorsement test to
find no Establishment Clause violation where teacher kept a Bible on his desk).
151. Holloman, 370 F.3d 1252.
152. Id. at 1289.
153. Id. at 1285.
154. Id. at 1284-85.
155. Id. at 1286.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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become. Part III.C explores teacher rights in settings removed from the
classroom, yet which still inherently bear the risk of being attributed to
the school.
C. Extracurricular Activities
Extracurricular activities, such as athletics, drama, or band
occupy an imperfect middle ground between curricular and noncurricular
activities. Activities are considered extracurricular if they function
outside of the school day yet still maintain the curricular qualities of
defined knowledge or skills established by the school that students must
develop or demonstrate. 5 9 While extracurricular activities are nominally
voluntary for the student, they are also considered "directly related" to a
school's curriculum. 
160
However, it is well settled that schools may not lead religious• •• 161
expression during extracurricular activities. Even if religious activity is
nominally student-initiated, courts are often skeptical if there has been a
, , . 162
history of school-sponsorship. For example, in Santa Fe Independent
School District v. Doe,1 63 the Supreme Court invalidated student-led
prayer before football games where there had been years of school
159. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (noting
that school-sponsored activities include "publications, theatrical productions, and
other expressive activities... so long as they are supervised by faculty members and
designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and
audiences.").
160. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Comm. Schs. v. Mergens By and Through
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 237-38 (1990).
161. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301-32 (2000);
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (finding that schools may not coordinate
prayers during graduation ceremonies). Under Hazelwood, these activities are still
school-sponsored, and thus may bear the imprimatur of the school. Hazelwood, 484
U.S. at 271. In Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court invalidated the speech of a
religious graduation speaker. Lee, 505 U.S. at 599. Employing the coercion test, the
Court argued that even though students had the option of attending, they did not
reasonably have the option to leave once they arrived. Id. at 593-94. Further, Justice
Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion, was not convinced that a graduation is
truly an optional experience for students, because it is such an important part of
schooling. Id. at 595.
162. Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402,406 (5th Cir. 1995).
163. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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sponsorship. 164In Santa Fe, the Court's holding did not turn on the
participation or symbolic conduct of staff members, but whether the
invocation was sufficiently student-led in light of years of school
encouragement of pre-game prayer.165 The Court primarily employed the
coercion test166 by looking at the effect pre-game prayers could have in a
stadium full of students participating in a voluntary extracurricular
activity closely connected to the school. 161
In the event of a facial challenge against a law or policy, courts
often apply some version of the Lemon test. 168 Since the decision
involved a facial challenge of the school's modified policy, the majority
in Santa Fe applied the Lemon test in addition to the coercion test,
holding that the school's involvement in establishing the student-led
invocation was an "excessive entanglement" with religion, violating the
third prong of Lemon. 69
Similarly, in Doe v. Duncanville Independent School District,1
70
decided before Santa Fe, the Fifth Circuit found coach participation in
student-initiated prayers to violate the Establishment Clause because the
prayers took place "during school-controlled, curriculum-related
activities that members of the basketball team are required to attend."'
7
'
In Duncanville, the coach either led or participated in prayers before
172practice and games for twenty years. Using the endorsement test, the
court held that the coach could not participate in the student prayers
because of the school-sponsored nature of the activity.173 However, the
court did note that the Establishment Clause does not prevent staff
members from treating students' religious beliefs and practices with
164. Id. at 304.
165. Id. at 305-06.
166. Id. at 300.
167. Id. at310.
168. See id at 305-06.
169. Id.
170. 70 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1995).
171. Id. at 406.
172. Id. at 404.
173. Id. at 406. The district court went so far as to preclude "supervision" of
student prayer as well, which the Fifth Circuit did not explicitly criticize. Id. The
court pointed out that as an extracurricular activity instead of a noncurricular
activity, the perception of school endorsement would preclude even supervision. Id.
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deference and respect. 174 While coaches do not have to make their non-
participation "vehemently obvious or to leave the room when students
pray," they still should not "join hands in a prayer circle or otherwise
,,175
manifest approval and solidarity with student religious exercises ... .
One area that remains unclear is what actions would constitute
"supervising" such that it would cross the line into endorsement. The
dissent in Duncanville expanded on this point by clarifying that while
staff members cannot "encourage[] or promot[e]" student prayer, the
"only questions here are how teachers may respond to student-initiated
prayers and to what extent the school may 'supervise' the prayers."'
' 76
While the dissenting judge agreed that staff members could not "actively
join[] in the student-led prayers," she said the courts should not "reach
into the minds of individual teachers to prescribe their responses to
student-initiated prayers."
'1 77
In 2007, the Third Circuit attempted to address this issue raised
by the Duncanville dissent in Borden v. School District of Township of
East Brunswick. 171 In Borden, the court invalidated active participation
by staff members, 179 but left the door open for symbolic conduct, such as
bowing one's head or kneeling. 18 The lead opinion did not find such
symbolic conduct to be inherently participatory, but used the
endorsement test to see "whether a reasonable observer familiar with the
history and context of the display would perceive the display as a
government endorsement of religion." 181 In Borden, a football coach
bowing his head during student prayer, coupled with a history of coach-
led prayer, violated the Establishment Clause under the endorsement
test.182 The concurring justice, however, felt that such symbolic conduct
would likely be deemed religious endorsement even without the history
of coach-led prayer, particularly in the coercive context of the football
174. Id. at 406 n.4.
175. Id.
176. Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 409 (5th Cir. 1995)
(Jones, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 409-410.
178. 523 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2008).
179. Id. at 167.
180. Id. at 178-79.
181. Id. at 175.
182. See generally id.
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locker room. 83 Since the three-judge panel in Borden issued three
different opinions, the case only serves to underscore the complicated
nature of symbolic religious conduct by teachers during extracurricular
activities.
D. Noncurricular Activities
Unlike curricular or extracurricular activities, noncurricular
activities "do[] not directly relate to the body of courses offered by the
school"' 184 and have only a loose relationship with the school.' 85 These
activities occur outside of instructional time and usually involve no more
than physical access to the school grounds in a limited public forum."'
The most familiar noncurricular activities are after school clubs, such as
chess club, or informal gatherings that are unconnected to the school
curriculum, such as Boy Scout or Girl Scout meetings. 187
While it is unclear whether teachers can supervise extracurricular
religious expression by students, that right seems to be well-established
in the noncurricular setting.' 88 For example, Justice O'Connor wrote in
Board of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens 89 that
the Equal Access Act (EAA) was constitutional, noting that school staff
were only allowed to be involved in after-school religious activities for
"custodial" or supervisory purposes.19 Actual participation, rather than
supervision, would suggest school sponsorship. 191 This emphasis on
183. Id. at 179-80 (McKee, J., concurring).
184. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Comm. Schs. v. Mergens By and Through
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 227 (1990).
185. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 113 (2001);
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 239-40.
186. Good News, 533 U.S. at 113; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ.
of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 240 (allowing Christian club
to have access to facilities after school where school had created a limited public
forum by allowing other non-curricular clubs).
187. Good News, 533 U.S. at 113; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 240; Doe v. Wilson
Cnty. Sch. Sys., 564 F. Supp. 2d 766, 778 (M.D. Tenn. 2008).
188. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 253 (holding that teachers could supervise after
school Christian club without violating the Establishment Clause).
189. !d. at 226.
190. Id. at 253.
191. Id. at 251.
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supervision rather than participation is also echoed by other cases.192
It is less clear whether teachers may actually participate in
noncurricular activities. The Supreme Court has emphasized that, at least
in the university setting, noncurricular activities can be characterized as
private speech, which is beyond the scope of the Establishment Clause.
193
However, the Court has not addressed this issue directly in the
elementary and secondary school context, though it did make a passing
reference to teacher involvement in Good News.194
With no Supreme Court precedent directly on point, lower courts
have used various approaches to determine the constitutionality of
teacher participation in noncurricular activities. 95 Courts typically use
the neutrality test in this context, 196 though in some cases the
endorsement test has been employed. 197
192. Daugherty v. Vanguard Charter Sch. Acad., 116 F. Supp. 2d 897, 911
(W.D. Mich. 2000); Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 56 (W.D. Mich. 1965)
("The role of the teacher at these pre- or post-school sessions is strictly that of one
charged with the responsibility of maintaining order.").
193. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842
(1995) (finding no Establishment Clause violation if public university were to
provide religious organization with funds, similar to other nonreligious student
groups).
194. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 117 (2001)
("Edwards involved the content of the curriculum taught by state teachers during the
schoolday to children required to attend. Obviously, when individuals who are not
schoolteachers are giving lessons after school to children permitted to attend only
with parental consent, the concerns expressed in Edwards are not present.")
(emphasis in original).
195. See, e.g., Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 815 (8th Cir.
2004) (finding no Establishment Clause violation where teacher participated in after-
school religious club because conduct constituted private speech); Doe v. Wilson
Cnty. Sch. Sys., 564 F. Supp. 2d 766, 795 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (finding Establishment
Clause violation where staff members attended religious event before school and
wore "I Prayed" stickers throughout the day).
196. See, e.g., Wigg, 382 F.3d at 815.
197. Wilson Cnty., 564 F. Supp. 2d at 793. The coercion test is not relevant in
this context, as students may freely choose whether or not to participate. Bd. of
Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 252 (1990) ("To the
extent that a religious club is merely one of many different student-initiated
voluntary clubs, students should perceive no message of government endorsement of
religion.").
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For example, in Wigg v. Sioux Falls School District 49-5,'98 the
Eighth Circuit used the neutrality test to uphold a teacher's right to
participate in a noncurricular religious club meeting held outside of
instructional hours, even though the club included students who were in
the teacher's class during the school day.' 99 The Eighth Circuit, relying
on language in Santa Fe, held that teacher involvement in noncurricular
clubs constitutes private speech and is beyond the EstablishmentC, 200
Clause's concern. The Wigg court also found support in Mergens, even
though that case did not actually reach the question of whether staff
201participation would constitute an Establishment Clause violation. In
Wigg, the court pointed to Mergens' guidance that there is a "crucial
202difference" between government speech and private speech. As a
result of Wigg and Mergens, using the neutrality test when evaluating
noncurricular private speech makes it likely that a teacher has a First
Amendment free speech or free exercise right to actively participate in or
203
even lead a religious club.
Conversely, in Doe v. Wilson County School System, 2°4 a federal
district court in Tennessee used the endorsement test to invalidate staff
participation in a "See You At the PoleTM ' event before school.2°' These
events, which are held in many schools across the across the country,
198. 382 F.3d. at 807.
199. Id. at 815.
200. Id. ("With the guidance of Doe and Santa Fe, we conclude that Wigg's
participation in the after-school Club constitutes private speech.").
201. Id. at 813. While Mergens implied that there might be an Establishment
Clause issue associated with staff participation in noncurricular activities, it did not
decide that issue because the Equal Access Act provided a bar to such conduct. Bd.
of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 252-53 (1990).
202. Id.
203. Id. Therefore, as other decisions have solidified noncurricular activities as
involving "private speech," Mergens is actually cited as a supporting argument for
allowing teachers to participate in after-school religious clubs. Wigg, 382 F.3d at
813. While teacher participation may be reconciled with Mergens on a constitutional
basis, that does not address the issue of why the Equal Access Act does not continue
to be a barrier to such involvement. It could be that even if SB 370 does not violate
the Establishment clause, it does explicitly violate the federal Equal Access Act.
That question is beyond this scope of this Note.
204. 564 F. Supp. 2d 766 (M.D. Tenn. 2008).
205. Id. at 794-95.
involve students praying together at the school flagpole.2°6 In Wilson,
students and parents gathered at the flagpole and recited prayers together
21for between 20 and 35 minutes before school. Staff members were
present and participated, but they did not lead any of the prayers.208
Although the event occurred before school, the court found that
school staff crossed the line into endorsement of religion."' The court
pointed out that in addition to bowing his head in prayer during the
flagpole prayer event, 21 the principal also wore an "I Prayed" sticker
throughout the school day as he visited classrooms. 21 1 Therefore, it is
possible that the court chose the endorsement test instead of the
neutrality test because the actions of the school staff had an effect
beyond the noncurricular activity.
E. Summary
In sum, teachers' First Amendment protections become more
limited the closer their religious activity intersects with the required
school curriculum. 212 During curricular activities, teachers' rights to
religious expression are limited because their conduct may be attributed
to the school, making the school susceptible to Establishment Clause
213
violations. During extracurricular activities, teachers may be present in
206. Id. at 781.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 781-82.
209. Id. at 794-95.
210. Id. at 782.
211. ld. at 786.
212. See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (noting that
public employees do not enjoy First Amendment protection during the course of
their required duties); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)
(holding that school officials can exercise authority over school-sponsored
activities); cf Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 815 (8th Cir. 2004)
(finding no Establishment Clause violation where teacher participated in after-school
religious club).
213. SCHNEIDER, supra note 125 at § 1:21 ("Courts have generally rejected
teachers' free exercise and free speech claims when school authorities have limited
or prohibited the teachers from engaging in religious expression during the course of
the teacher's official responsibilities."); Durham & Smith, supra note 125 at § 12:6
(pointing out government's unique role as "sovereign and employer" in the context
of public schools, specifically in regards to a free speech analysis).
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a custodial capacity, but they may not participate in student religious
expression. 2 14 During noncurricular activities, teachers may be able to
participate in religious activities on school grounds, provided that it is
clear they are acting in a private capacity.21 5 As discussed above, the
Court's three fundamental distinctions are not always clear to
stakeholders, and laws like S.B. 370 attempt to bring clarity to unsettled
First Amendment jurisprudence.
IV. THE NORTH CAROLINA RESPECT FOR STUDENT PRAYER AND
RELIGIOUS ACTIVITY ACT
S.B. 370 was passed in 2014 to clarify student and teacher
religious rights. Part IV.A discusses in greater detail the legislative
history of S.B. 370. Part IV.B describes the rights that S.B. 370 codifies
for school employees. Part IV.C describes additional provisions of the
law that are relevant to teacher rights, such as the savings clause and the
severability clause. Finally, Part 1V.D summarizes the legal effect of S.B.
370 regarding teacher rights to religious expression at school.
A. Legislative History
S.B. 370 was prompted by two events in McDowell County
during the fall of 2012. 216 A first-grade student at West Marion
Elementary School was selected to read a poem she wrote about her
grandfather at a Veterans Day school assembly. 21 7 In the poem, the
student wrote that her grandfather, who was a veteran, "prayed to God
for strength, he prayed to God for peace." 218 Prior to the assembly, a
member of the community who discovered the content of the poem
expressed concerns to West Marion's principal that a poem read aloud at
214. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253
(1990).
215. See, e.g., Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 815 (8th Cir.
2004).
216. Exum, supra note 2.
217. Outrage results after school officials force girl to remove word from
veteran's poem, WSOCTV.COM (Dec. 3, 2012),
http://www.wsoctv.com/news/news/local/outrage-results-after-school-officials-
force-girl-/nTMCd/ ("He prayed to God for strength, he prayed to God for peace.").
218. Id.
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a school assembly with a reference to "God" appeared to be a school
endorsement of religion. 219 After consultation between the school
principal and the district superintendent, the student was asked to not
read that line during the assembly. 22° Also that year, the McDowell
County School Board purportedly told high school athletic coaches that
they had to leave the locker room if students engaged in student-initiated
221prayer before or after games. Coaches apparently were upset by this
regulation, as evidenced by subsequent comments by lawmakers that it is
a "sad day" when coaches are not allowed to "bow their head[s]" when
222
students pray.
Other lawmakers declared that North Carolina had taken the
223
separation of church and state too far. Three North Carolina
legislators 224 proposed a law that would keep districts from limiting
225
student and staff religious expression. Opponents of S.B. 370
226questioned the necessity and constitutionality of the bill, arguing that
some of the language may run afoul of the Establishment Clause because
227
it allows teachers to endorse religious practices.
219. Todd Starnes, School Orders Child to Remove God From Poem, FOX
NEWS RADIO, http://radio.foxnews.com/toddstames/top-stories/school-orders-child-
to-remove-god-from-poem.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2015).
220. Id.
221. See Exum, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
222. See Leslie, supra note 1.
223. Leslie, supra note 1 ("Anything about separation of church and state, all
that stuff, it's not even in the Constitution. We need to remember what principles
this country was founded on.").
224. The primary sponsors of S.B. 370 were Stan Bingham, Warren Daniel,
and Ralph Hise. SENATE BILL 370 / S.L. 2014-13, NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL
ASSEMBLY,
http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2013&BiIID=S
370&votesToView-all (last visited Mar. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Bill History]. Hise is
the only one of the three who represents McDowell County. SENATE
REPRESENTATION BY COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/members/memberList.pl?sChamber-senate (last
visited Apr. 7, 2015).
225. See S.B. 370, Sess. Law 2014-13, §1 (N.C. 2014) (codified in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-407).
226. Leslie, supra note 1.
227. Id. ("[The law] gets into the entanglement issue under the First
Amendment [because it allows] teachers [to participate] in a way that crosses the
line and endorses the practice ....").
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Initially, the language of S.B. 370 included only a basic
explanation of student and staff rights.228 However, later drafts included
more detailed descriptions of student rights,229 as well as a grievance
230 231' 232procedure, savings clause, and severability clause.
S.B. 370 quickly passed the Senate in 2013, but was not heard in the
233House until June 2014. After a debate, which included comments
234critical of the bill by Rep. Glazier and others, S.B. 370 passed the
House by a vote of 106 to 9,23' and Governor Pat McCrory signed the bill
into law on June 10, 2014.236
B. Religious Rights for Staff
S.B. 370 was codified as N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-407.30-32.
Specifically, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-407.32(b) ("Section (b)"), allows
school staff to participate in student-led non-curricular religious
activities, as long as they do not conflict with other academic
responsibilities. 237 Additionally, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-407.32(c)
228. The Respect for Student Prayer and Religious Activity Act, S.B. 370,
Sess. Law 2014-13 (N.C. 2014) (as filed on Mar. 19, 2013),
http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2013/Bills/Senate/PDF/S370v0.pdf.
229. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1 15C-407.30 (2014).
230. N.C. GEN. STAT. § I I5C-407.31 (2014).
231. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1 15C-407.33 (2014).
232. S.B. 370, Sess. Law 2014-13, §3 (N.C. 2014).
233. SENATE BILL 370 / S.L. 2014-13, NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BilILookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2013&BilIID=S
370&votesToView=all (last visited March 2, 2015) [hereinafter Bill History].
234. During the House Committee debate, Representative Glazier offered an
amendment to remove phrasing that would allow teachers to "adopt a respectful
posture" when students were engaged in voluntary prayer, but it was struck down.
Leslie, supra note 1. In an attempt to ease Glazier's concerns, the committee added a
severability clause designed to keep the remainder of the bill intact if any provision
is struck down by the courts. Audio recording: North Carolina House Debate on
Senate Bill 370 (June 4, 2014),
http://www.ncleg.net/DocumentSites/HouseDocuments/2013-
2014%20Session/Audio%20Archives/2014/06-04-2014.mp3 (starting at 1:37:45).
Ultimately, Rep. Glazier voted for the bill, though he continued to express his
reservations during the House debate. Id.
235. Bill History, supra note 233.
236. Anderson, supra note 4.
237. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.32(b) (2014).
("Section (c)") allows teachers to "adopt a respectful posture" during
238
student-led extracurricular religious activities.
In Section (b), "conflict" most likely means "to occur at the
same time," which would distinguish the provision from one that protects
conduct during extracurricular activities, such as athletics or theater.
However, one could argue that a "conflict" does not exist unless private
conduct is incompatible or frustrates the purpose of a school
responsibility. 239 For example, a football coach may think he can
participate in a pre-game prayer because it would supplement, not
interfere with his responsibilities as a football coach. As a counter
example, if a teacher was assigned to supervise students in the cafeteria
after school, yet left to participate in prayer with a religious noncurricular
club, a "conflict" would exist. Thus, an argument could be made that a
plain reading of the statute allows staff participation in any religious
expression (extracurricular or noncurricular) on school grounds before or
after school.
Still, the fact that the law permits participation in "religious
activities , 240 suggests that the event itself is religious in nature, as
opposed to religious expression within an event of a different
241
character. Since extracurricular activities cannot be religious, because
they are established by the school, 242 Section (b) would be limited to
noncurricular activities. Additionally, by inserting the phrase "voluntary
for all parties '243 the law suggests that "religious activities" are outside
of an employee's contractual time, and thus would not include events or
clubs that teachers are assigned to supervise.
Furthermore, if staff were allowed to participate in any religious
expression before or after school, there would be no need to protect their
238. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.32(c) (2014).
239. Conflict Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conflict (last visited Mar. 2, 2015)
("competitive or opposing action of incompatibles").
240. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15C-407.32(b) (2014).
241. For example, participation in a Christian-themed non-curricular club
could be considered a "religious activity" different from participating in prayer
(religious expression) before a football game (extracurricular activity).
242. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1962) (holding that an
official prayer, established by the school, violates the Establishment Clause).
243. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.32(b) (2014).
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right to "adopt a respectful posture' '244 during a game-time prayer. Since
245laws are presumed to be constitutional, Section (b) likely refers to
noncurricular events while Section (c) refers only to extracurricular
events. Therefore, for the remainder of this Note, Section (b) will be said
to apply only to noncurricular activities, while Section (c) will apply to
extracurricular activities. In addition to Section (b) and Section (c), S.B.
370 includes limitations on how the law may be interpreted. Part 1V.C
discusses the law's savings clause and severability clause.
C. Additional Relevant Provisions
1. Savings Clause
S.B. 370 includes a savings clause, codified as N.C. Gen. Stat. §
115C-407.33 ("savings clause"), which forbids courts from construing
the law in a way that allows school districts to "take any action in
violation of the Constitution of North Carolina or the United States., 246 A
savings clause is defined as "an exemption from the general operation of
a statute.''247 It is generally used to preserve existing rights in the event
that a statute is being repealed.248 However, if the plain meaning of the
statute suggests otherwise, the savings clause itself is given no effect. 49
Here, if the savings clause is to be given full effect, S.B. 370 could never
be ruled unconstitutional. If the statute does not permit conduct
prohibited by the Constitution, then by definition the only conduct
protected by S.B. 370 is that which is constitutional. Therefore, applying
savings clause jurisprudence, if a court finds the plain language of the
244. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.32(c) (2014).
245. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 351 (1987).
246. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.33 (2014) ("This Article shall not be
construed to direct any local board of education to take any action in violation of the
Constitution of North Carolina or the United States. The specification of rights in
this Article shall not be construed to exclude or limit religious liberty or free speech
rights otherwise protected by federal, State, or local law.").
247. Id. at § 21:12.
248. Id. at § 47:12.
249. Id. ("[A] repugnancy between a saving clause and an act's purview does
not void the enacting part, but invalidates the saving clause.").
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statute to authorize unconstitutional conduct, the savings clause will be
ruled invalid.
2. Severability Clause
S.B. 370 also includes a severability clause, codified in N.C.
Gen. Stat. 115C-407.33, section 3 ("severability clause"). 250 If any
provision is found to be unconstitutional either facially or as applied, the
provision is to be severed and the remaining provisions are still given
effect.25 In other words, if the courts were to strike down one section of
the law, the remaining provisions would still be in effect.
D. Legal Effect of S.B. 3 70
S.B. 370 expands the rights of teachers in N.C. schools. As
discussed in Part II, the First Amendment rights of teachers during
extracurricular and noncurricular activities remain somewhat unclear. On
one hand, cases like Lee and Santa Fe teach that if religious speech is
part of an official school function, religious activity led by adults is
252prohibited. On the other hand, cases such as Mergens, Good News, and
Wigg suggest that religious activity outside of instructional hours, as part
of a noncurricular group, would be permissible since it represents
"private speech."253 Still, other cases have failed to find an absolute free
exercise or free speech right in such an activity, 254 and view any
participation, even symbolic, as a violation of the Establishment
255Clause. Therefore, based on the unique facts and jurisdiction of each
250. Senate Bill 370, Session Law 2014-13, §3 (codified in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-407.33 (2014)).
251. Id.
252. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992).
253. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001); Bd. of
Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990); Wigg v.
Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 815 (8th Cir. 2004).
254. Quappe v. Endry, 772 F. Supp. 1004, 1014 (S.D. Ohio 1991).
255. Id. at 1014; Doe v. Wilson Cnty. Sch. Sys., 564 F. Supp. 2d 766, 778
(M.D. Tenn. 2008) (finding Establishment Clause violation where staff members
bowed their heads during prayer before school and wore "I Prayed" stickers
throughout the day).
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case, teachers may or may not have the right to participate in or lead
religious activities with students present.
S.B. 370 creates an affirmative right for teachers to "adopt a
respectful posture" 256 and to participate in extracurricular and
257
noncurricular activities. With such a wide variance in the way
religious expression has been addressed by the courts, the real question
becomes whether S.B. 370's expansion of religious rights violates the
Establishment Clause.
V. DOES S.B. 370 VIOLATE THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE?
Since S.B. 370 expands teachers' rights to engage in religious
258expression in schools, as Part IV explained, the constitutionality of the
statute must be analyzed under the Establishment Clause. To accomplish
this task the two central provisions of S.B. 370 should be analyzed
independently: Section (b), which protects a teacher's right to participate
. . .. 259
with students in noncurricular activities and Section (c), which protects
a teacher's right to "adopt a respectful posture" during student-led
extracurricular religious expression. 260 To pass muster under the
Constitution, each provision must survive both facial and as applied
challenges. Under a facial challenge, there must be no set of facts that the
261law can be constitutional.. With an as applied challenge, the law must
be unconstitutional only as applied to particular facts and
circumstances.262
Part V.A analyzes the constitutionality of Section (b) using the
endorsement test and the neutrality test. Part V.B analyzes Section (c)
using the coercion, endorsement, and neutrality tests. Finally, Part V.C
256. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1 15C-407.32(c) (2014).
257. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1 15C-407.32(b) (2014).
258. See supra Part IV.
259. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.32(b) (2014).
260. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1 15C-407.32(c) (2014).
261. WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 1:5 (3d ed. 2014)
("Only in exceptional cases will judges declare that statutes and ordinances are void
on their face; in such cases, judges must consider 'every conceivable situation which
might possibly arise' and conclude that the legislation is, nevertheless, always
unconstitutional.").
262. Id.
459
looks at the effect of both the savings clause and the severability clause
on the constitutionality of S.B. 370.
A. Can Teachers Participate in Noncurricular Religious Activities?
Regarding staff participation in student-led activities that are not
school sponsored, S.B. 370 is likely to be constitutional. As described in
Part III, in recent years, courts have analyzed noncurricular activity using
the neutrality test. 263 However, in some cases, courts have used the
endorsement test when the facts and circumstances suggest the religious
activity may be attributed to the school and not the individual teacher's
• 264
private expression. Therefore, Part V.A. 1 analyzes the constitutionality
of Section (b) using the neutrality test while Part V.A.2 analyzes the
provision using the endorsement test.
1. Neutrality Test
Under the neutrality test, the government may give deference to
First Amendment expression as long as it does not discriminate for or
265
against religion. Using this test, the emphasis is on the private rights of
the individual as opposed to the government.
266
Here, Section (b) allows teachers to participate in noncurricular
student-led religious activities as long as it is "voluntary for all
,, 267parties. Using the neutrality test, this provision will likely be
considered constitutional. While participation conflicts with the
reasoning used in Mergens, the Mergens Court never actually ruled on
whether teachers could participate in noncurricular activities. Rather, the
Court did not have to reach that question because the Equal Access Act
(EAA) limited teacher conduct to custodial supervision. 268In fact,
263. See supra Part II.
264. Id.
265. JAMES RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 2.01 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2014).
266. Id.
267. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15C-407.32(b) (2014).
268. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 251
(1990). Indeed, S.B. 370 may violate the EAA, but that beyond the scope of this
Note.
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Mergens made clear that if considered private speech, an Establishment
269Clause analysis is unnecessary.
While not directly on point, subsequent Supreme Court cases
have convinced some lower courts that teacher participation in
noncurricular activities would satisfy the neutrality test.27° Applying the
reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in Wigg v. Sioux Falls School District 49-
5,271 the teacher's actions will be seen as private speech and would not
272implicate government endorsement. Further, using this test, there
would not be any restrictions on the teacher with respect to the students
involved.27 ' For example, the fact that students assigned to the teacher's
class during the school day also participated in the religious activity
would not prohibit the teacher from participating as well.
274
2. Endorsement Test
In some noncurricular activity cases, courts have used the
endorsement test. Under the endorsement test, the Court looks at whether
a secular purpose exists, and whether the principal or primary effect
275
either advances or inhibits religion. As a tool in this analysis, the Court
asks whether a reasonable person observing the activity would perceive
276
school endorsement. While it is a close question, a court would not
likely find S.B. 370 to violate the endorsement test.
First, a court would likely find that the law has a secular purpose
under the first prong of the endorsement test. 277 S.B. 370 purports to
269. Id. at 250.
270. Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 815 (8th Cir. 2004)
(citing Mergens and Santa Fe in support of treating teacher involvement in religious
activities after school as "private speech.").
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 815-16 (allowing teacher to participate in religious activities after
school at the same campus at which she worked).
274. Id.
275. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(finding town creche display was not "intended to endorse [n]or [have] the effect of
endorsing Christianity.").
276. See, e.g., Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 479 (6th Cir. 2002).
277. To have a secular purpose, the expressed intent of the law must not be to
advance religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). Typically, great
deference is given to the purpose stated by the legislature, id., though there must be a
"clarify religious activity for school personnel. 278 As described in Part
IV, S.B. 370 was prompted in part by a school district that told coaches
to leave the room if students engaged in prayer before a game.279 As a
result, the legislature was concerned that the teacher's free exercise
rights were being violated out of confusion over the Establishment
Clause.280 Thus, the legislature would likely argue that the purpose of
S.B. 370 was not to advance religion, but rather to protect religious
rights.
On the other hand, future litigants could argue that S.B. 370 has
no other real purpose other than the advancement of religion. If the law
extends protections to religious expression that were not otherwise
protected, certainly one could argue there is not a valid secular
281
purpose.
Ultimately, however, courts have found that protecting citizens
282from religious discrimination is a valid secular purpose. While in
281
Mergens, the EAA protected both religious and nonreligious speech,
Justice O'Connor explicitly stated in her concurring opinion in Wallace
that based on the Free Exercise Clause, if a statute's intent is to "lift[] a
government-imposed burden on the free exercise of religion," the statute
284has a valid secular purpose. Therefore, even if some legislators were
motivated by a nonsecular purpose, S.B. 370 would still meet the
Mergens standard. Thus, a court would likely find the protection--even
expansion---of religious rights to be a secular purpose.
connection between the stated purpose and the means used by the law to reach that
purpose. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 64 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[The]
secular purpose must be 'sincere'; a law will not pass constitutional muster if the
secular purpose articulated by the legislature is merely a 'sham."').
278. Senate Bill 370, Session Law 2014-13, § 1 (codified in N.C. GEN. STAT. §
115C-407.32 (2014)).
279. Exum, supra note 2.
280. Id.
281. Indeed, news reports and legislative debate centered on the concern that
teachers were not able to freely express their religious beliefs around their students,
suggesting a potential impermissible purpose. See Leslie, supra note 1.
282. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248-49
(1990) ("Congress' avowed purpose-to prevent discrimination against religious and
other types of speech-is undeniably secular.").
283. Id.
284. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Second, to satisfy the endorsement test the provision must not
have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.
285
In this case, resolution of the effects prong would likely hinge on
whether a staff member's religious expression was viewed as an
286endorsement of religion by the students. While the Supreme Court has
not addressed this narrow issue, recent circuit court opinions suggest that
287a final determination would be a fact-intensive inquiry.
In Doe v. Wilson County School System, 28 a Tennessee federal
district court disapproved of staff participation in a flagpole prayer event
held on school grounds before the beginning of the instructional day.
289
Under these circumstances most courts have applied the neutrality test.
29°
However, the Wilson court chose to apply the endorsement test, largely
because the principal wore an "I Prayed" sticker on campus during the
remainder of the school day,291 and the court was concerned about the
symbolism of the principal's participation in the noncurricular activity.
292
While it is not clear whether the court would have ruled the same way in
the absence of the principal's sticker, the outcome of Wilson suggests
that there may be certain fact patterns where endorsement proves to be
more salient than neutrality.
Here, Wilson's isolated example of a court applying the
endorsement test to noncurricular activities provides little guidance in
how a court would interpret S.B. 370. Since Wilson relied heavily on
unique facts, a court applying the endorsement test to S.B. 370 would
likely find no facial violation of the Establishment Clause. Particular
facts connected to a unique situation could change the interpretation
285. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (finding town creche display was not "intended to endorse [n]or [have]
the effect of endorsing Christianity.").
286. See, e.g., Doe v. Wilson Cnty. Sch. Sys., 564 F. Supp. 2d 766, 792 (M.D.
Tenn. May 29, 2008).
287. Id. at 793.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 795.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 270-74.
291. Wilson, 564 F. Supp. 2d 766, 795 (M.D. Tenn. 2008).
292. Id. ("This telegraphed to believers and non-believers alike their
identification with those who gathered to pray on that day. Such religious activity by
school authority figures on school property in the presence of young students has an
influential effect on such students.").
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significantly, but absent those facts, S.B. 370 would not likely be seen as
endorsing religion.
3. Constitutionality of Section (b)
In sum, under either the neutrality or endorsement test, Section
(b) would likely pass a facial challenge. Similarly, this provision would
most likely survive an "as applied" challenge. However, if the court
chooses to use the endorsement test, an "as applied" challenge may be
successful, if the facts and circumstances create a connection between
the teacher and the required curriculum.
B. Can Teachers "Adopt a Respectful Posture" During Extracurricular
Religious Expression?
While S.B. 370 is may survive a facial challenge, there is a good
chance the law could be deemed unconstitutional as applied to school-
sponsored extracurricular activities. Indeed, mere supervision is
293
constitutional in either the extracurricular or noncurricular setting, and
as other cases, such as Mergens indicate, this "custodial" function rarely
294implicates an Establishment concern. S.B. 370, however, may be
interpreted to go beyond mere supervision. It is less clear which test
courts would use for the Section (c) provision; therefore, Part V.B will
291
use each likely alternative (neutrality, coercion, and endorsement).
293. Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253
(1990).
294. Id. at 236.
295 . While the neutrality test has been employed most often in the
noncurricular setting, it is used less often in the extracurricular setting. See e.g., id. at
252 (allowing religious non-curricular club to meet after school because school had
allowed other non-curricular clubs to meet); Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5,
382 F.3d 807, 815 (8th Cir. 2004); Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick,
523 F.3d 153, 175 (3d Cir. 2008) (using endorsement test to invalidate coach's
symbolic expression that would reasonably be perceived as endorsing religion). As
extracurricular activities are closer in nature to the required school curriculum, the
Supreme Court has been more likely to employ the coercion test in these situations.
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992). Still, courts have also shown a willingness to
adopt the more strict endorsement test standard in these situations as well. Borden,
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Part V.B. I analyzes the constitutionality of Section (c) using the
neutrality test, while Parts V.B.2 and 3 analyze the law using the
coercion and endorsement test, respectively.
1. Neutrality Test
Under the neutrality test, courts allow religious expression by
government actors if it is exercised as a private citizen and other similar
nonreligious expression would be allowed as well. 296 Here, Section (c)
allows teachers to "adopt a respectful posture" when students engage in
prayer during an extracurricular activity. 297 The neutrality analysis may
depend partially on whether Garcetti v. Ceballos298 applies to teachers. In
Garcetti, the Court held that public employee First Amendment rights
are not implicated when they occur in the course of the normal duties.299
The Court notably failed to address whether this principle applied in
schools, 3°° though lower courts have done so.
30 1
If Garcetti does apply to teachers, they would not have a
protected First Amendment interest during extracurricular activities. This
means schools as employers could limit teacher expression during these
times. However, Garcetti does not explicitly prohibit a state from
creating such a religious protection, so long as it does not result in an
Establishment Clause violation. If Garcetti does not apply to teachers,
then they would retain First Amendment protections during
extracurricular activities, and the neutrality test would likely be used to
uphold Section (c) because the protected action of the teacher would
need to be preserved in order to maintain neutrality toward religion.
523 F.3d at 175 (using endorsement test to invalidate coach's symbolic expression
that would reasonably be perceived as endorsing religion).
296. Wigg, 382 F.3d at 815.
297. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.32(c) (2014). This language is different
from "participate" which is used on 407.32(b) with regards to noncurricular
activities. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.32(b) (2014).
298. 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006) (noting that the Court need not decide in the
present case whether Garcetti analysis would apply to teachers).
299. Id. at421.
300. Id. at 425.
301. Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City. Exempted Sch. Vill. Sch.
Dist., 624 F.3d 332, 334 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Garcetti to teachers and finding
no teacher First Amendment protections pursuant to official duties).
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Notwithstanding Garcetti, if courts apply the neutrality test,
Section (c) will likely be deemed constitutional, particularly if the
protected expression is not considered overtly religious. Under Section
302(c), teachers are not allowed to engage in religious expression. Rather,
they are required to be respectful of student religious expression, and
they "may adopt a respectful posture."30 3 In that sense, a court could
decide that a coach was being neutral toward religion, even if he bowed
his head or put his knee to the ground. However, such action could also
be construed as an endorsement of religion, which is why many cases
involving similar actions implicate the coercion or endorsement test.
2. Coercion Test
Under the coercion test, courts would analyze whether having
the teacher adopt a respectful posture would coerce students into
religious activity. In the context of extracurricular activities, the Court
has found it appropriate to use this test because the activity is not truly
voluntary in the same sense as noncurricular activities.
304
Determining whether there is coercion usually relies heavily
upon context. 30 5 For example, in Lee, the Court found coercion in a
school district's practice of inviting religious speakers to give prayers at
graduation ceremonies, both at the middle and high school levels.30 6
Since young students are more impressionable, the Court held that the
graduation prayer would impermissibly direct student thought, leaving
. • . 307
dissenters no practical options for non-participation. Similarly, in
Santa Fe, the Court viewed as coercive a school's practice of allowing an
elected student speaker give an invocation before the crowd prior to
302. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.32(c) (2014) (stating that teachers can
be present while a student group prays, and that they cannot be disrespectful of the
students but may instead adopt a respectful posture.).
303. Id.
304. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 311-12 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992).
305. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 308; Lee, 505 U.S. at 592-93; Borden v. Sch. Dist.
of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 181 (3d Cir. 2008) (McKee, J., concurring)
(analyzing a coach's symbolic expression under the coercion test given the unique
environment of a sports locker room).
306. Lee, 505 U.S. at 599.
307. Id. at 593.
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308football games. In that case, the Court was skeptical that the prayer
was "student-led," as the school had a history of sponsoring prayer
before football games.30 9 Further, by taking place in front of the entire
crowd, the Court looked at the coercive effect such a large-scale display
•- . 310
would have on students who did not wish to participate.
Moreover, some opinions have found staff-led religious
expression invalid without respect to a history of school-sponsored
prayer.3 11 For example, in Borden, the concurring opinion found that
bowing one's head and kneeling during student-led prayer constituted
312impermissible coercion, even beyond the particular facts of the case.
Here, Section (c) allows a teacher or coach to "adopt a respectful
posture" with students, 313 but it does not permit the large-scale prayer
such as at a graduation ceremony or in front of a full football stadium.
Still, as in Borden and Duncanville, in the close-knit environment of
sports or other extracurricular activities, students may feel more pressure
to participate in prayer if it looks like the teacher is praying as well.
Students may be less likely to avoid participation if doing so appears to
go against the wishes of the authority figure in the room.
Thus, if a court analyzed Section (c) using the coercion test, it
would likely pass a facial challenge. However, it would likely fail an "as
applied" challenge if any particular facts or circumstances suggested the
prayer was not purely student-led.
3. Endorsement Test
The endorsement test is much more strict than the neutrality or
coercion test in that it takes less government action to cross the threshold
into being an Establishment Clause violation. 314 Using this test, as in
308. Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301.
309. Id. at 306-07. Similarly, Borden relied heavily on the prior impermissible
pattern of school sponsorship of prayer. Borden, 523 F.3d at 178-79.
310. Id. at 295.
311. Id. at 179 (McKee, J., concurring) (noting that symbolic expression may
still have been prohibited even without the history of school-endorsement of prayer).
312. Id. at 179.
313. N.C. GEN. STAT. § I 15C-407.32(c) (2014).
314. See e.g., Wigg v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 382 F.3d 807, 815 (8th Cir.
2004) (finding no Establishment Clause violation using neutrality test where teacher
participated in after-school religious club); Doe v. Wilson Cnty. Sch. Sys., 564 F.
Borden and Duncanville,315 it is not clear whether allowing the teacher to
"adopt a respectful posture" 316 on its own would be enough to constitute
a violation. Since Section (c) only allows supervision, as opposed to
participation,' 17 there may still be scenarios in which the endorsement
test could be satisfied. For example, if the teacher stood in the room with
his hands behind his back and his eyes open, that could be considered a
respectful posture, yet it may not rise to the level of an endorsement of
the religious activity, because it is not typically associated with prayer.
Other courts may nonetheless find that no set of facts could
make the provision constitutional. However, courts that have used the
endorsement test in the past have never found such innocuous conduct to
be endorsement, instead focusing on overt acts such as bowing one's
head or kneeling. 318 In this context, a court would likely find an
Establishment violation under the endorsement test, as the Supreme
Court did in Santa Fe,3'9 and lower courts did in Duncanville"2 and
Borden.2
Therefore, it is less clear whether an Establishment Clause
violation would exist for bowing one's head or kneeling in the absence of
a history of government endorsement. In the context of a close-knit
locker room of players, this conduct by the coach, who is in a position of
authority and is an extension the government, may be seen as advancing
religious beliefs, just as in Borden322 and Duncanville."'
Supp. 2d 766, 795 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (finding that certain practices by the school
did not have a secular purpose and consequently such practices led to the school
being excessively entangled with religion in violation of the Establishment Clause).
315. Borden, 523 F.3d at 175 ; Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d
402, 405 (5th Cir. 1995). Though Duncanville nominally employs the Lemon test, it
relies heavily on the modified endorsement version discussed in Mergens.
Duncanville, 70 F.3d at 406.
316. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.32(c) (2014).
317. Id.
318. Borden, 523 F.3d at 175 (denying a coach the right to bow his head or
kneel during student-led prayer).
319. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000).
320. Duncanville, 70 F.3d at 406 n. 4..
321. Borden, 523 F.3d at 175.
322. Id. at 178.
323. Duncanville, 70 F.3d at 406.
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4. Constitutionality of Section (c)
If courts opt to use the neutrality test when evaluating teacher
religious expression during extracurricular activities, Section (c) will
likely be upheld. However, if courts use either the coercion or
endorsement test, the provision may be invalid as applied to teachers
who bow their heads or kneel in the presence of student-led prayer. Still,
the inquiry will be heavily fact-based and a history of school sponsorship
of religious activity would most likely be needed to find the statute
unconstitutional.
C. Effect of the Savings Clause and Severability Clause
Legislators added a savings clause124 and a severability clause
325
to S.B. 370 in an effort to preserve its constitutionality. S.B. 370's
savings clause requires courts to construe the law in a way that is
326
constitutional. In the event that effort fails, the severability clause
327
requires that the remainder of the law stay in effect.
While seemingly making the law impervious to challenge, the
savings clause is not an absolute protection. 328 If the court's
interpretation of the plain language of the statute conflicts with the
Constitution, a court's interpretation stands and the savings clause
fails. 329 It is not clear what impact this would have on S.B. 370. If it is a
close question, would the court simply protect the teacher's action as
constitutional? Would the court put the teacher's action outside of the
law's protection, making the S.B. 370 constitutional, but the teacher's
action unconstitutional? The outcome would likely be determined by the
level of confidence the court has in its analysis.
324. Senate Bill 370, Session Law 2014-13, (codified in N.C. GEN. STAT. §
115C-407.33 (2014)).
325. Senate Bill 370, Session Law 2014-13, § 3 (codified in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-407.33 (2014)).
326. Senate Bill 370, Session Law 2014-13, (codified in N.C. GEN. STAT. §
115C-407.33 (2014)).
327. Senate Bill 370, Session Law 2014-13, § 3 (codified in N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 115C-407.33 (2014)).
328. NORMAN SINGER & SHAMBLE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:12 (2014).
329. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Justice Thomas once wrote that "[o]ur [Establishment Clause]
jurisprudential confusion has led to results that can only be described as
silly. 330 Regardless of political affilation, this statement likely rings true
in the analysis of S.B. 370. Parts II and III have described the varying
tests that can be employed to resolve Establishment Clause concerns
during various extracurricular and noncurricular school activities. Part V
described the North Carolina legislature's recent attempt to "clarify"
33
complex First Amendment precedent by allowing teachers to participate
in student-led noncurricular activities before or after school and "adopt a
332
respectful posture" during student-initiated extracurricular prayer. Part
V illustrated the inherent danger of this clarity. Teachers may engage in
conduct they believe to be lawful, only to have it deemed
unconstitutional. Further, by encouraging potential Establishment Clause
violations on a day-to-day basis, impressionable students may be coerced
into adopting the religious beliefs of their teachers.
In the end, simplifying the tension between the Establishment
Clause on one hand and the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses on
the other hand, could add clarity to the constitutional issues raised by S.B
370. However, the reality is that there will always be inevitable tension
between closely related First Amendment doctrines and any clarity by
the North Carolina General Assembly carries a risk of distorting all three
provisions. Therefore, lawmakers should tread lightly when addressing
these delicate issues of religion, recognizing that even good intentions
can lead to the deprivation of rights that are fundamental to American
society.
330. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 541 U.S. 1, 45 n. 1 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
331. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-407.30-33 (2014).
332. Id. at § 115C-407.32(c).
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